jonathan caleb kendrick

The Samaritan Paradox (Prior, 1958) is often taken to show that deontic ought is not upward monotonic. In particular, it’s often taken to show that ⌜ought (A ∧ B)⌝ does not entail ⌜ought A⌝. Parallel examples are often taken to show that desire ascriptions are not upward monotonic. We argue that this is mistaken. The Samaritan Paradox is really about presupposition; in particular, it shows that the domain of deontics can be restricted by their prejacent’s local context. We show that the resulting account yields natural solutions to Aqvist’s Paradox and the Paradox of Gentle Murder.

Santorio (2022, 2025) observes that ability modals give rise to a puzzling asymmetry in quantificational strength. In upward-entailing contexts, ability modals are stronger than circumstantial possibility modals; however, in downward-entailing contexts, ability modals are at least as weak as circumstantial possibility modals. To solve this problem, I sketch an analogy with homogeneous plural definite descriptions which exhibit a similar strength asymmetry. Building on a theory of plural definite descriptions proposed by Krifka (1996) and Spector (2013), I propose that the quantificational force of ability modals is underspecified, and the strength asymmetry between upward- and downward-entailing contexts is due to a general pragmatic preference for interpreting an utterance as having the strongest meaning possible

The Lewis-Kratzer restrictor theory of conditionals struggles to account for a key difference between epistemic and deontic conditionals: while the epistemic conditional ⌜if ϕ, must ϕ⌝ is trivially true, the deontic conditional ⌜if ϕ, ought ϕ⌝ is not trivially true. I propose a simple solution to this problem: deontic and epistemic modals are sensitive to different kinds of reasons. Deontic modals are sensitive to reasons for action, while epistemic modals are sensitive to reasons for belief. The initial contrast arises, because, while the fact that ϕ is always a reason for believing ϕ, the fact that ϕ is not always a reason for doing ϕ. In this paper, we make this intuition precise by drawing on the default premise semantics proposed by Cariani (2024, 2025) which enriches a Kratzer’s (1981a, 1986, 2012) premise semantics for modals and conditionals with defaults rules from non-monotonic logic.

Extant dynamic theories of anaphora, like Dynamic Predicate Logic (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991), account for donkey anaphora by validating Egli’s corollary: (∃xPx) > Qx ⇔ ∀x(Px > Qx). However, since Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents (SDA) and Egli’s corollary are (essentially) equivalent, if ‘>’ is given a variably-strict semantics, Egli’s Principle doesnot immediately follow. In this paper, I derive Egli’s Principle based on a dynamic implementation of the Exh-based approach to SDA developed by Bar-Lev and Fox (2020). This account has two upshots. First, it predicts failures of Egli’s Principle in identificational sentences. Second, it offers a straightforward account of the ∃/∀ ambiguity in donkey sentences.

According to the standard theory, a disjunction ⌜A or B⌝, the disjunct B is evaluated in a local context updated with the negation of the earlier conjunct ¬A. However, in (1a), the second disjunct is evaluated in a local context updated with a constituent of the first disjunct. (1) a. John must have failed his exam, or he would be happy. b. ⇒ If John passed his exam, he would be happy. To solve this problem, we propose a novel semantics for disjunction where the information state of the second disjunct is sensitive to the structurally-derived alternatives of the first disjunct. We then apply the resulting theory to solve a similar problem posed by anankastic conditionals.

We integrate Portner's theory of To-Do Lists with Schlenker's theory of local contexts. The resulting theory explains why imperatives often license restricted reading of modals in both disjunctions and conjunctions.

In this paper, we provide the first characterization of the semantics of conditionals headed by in case. We make two empirical contributions. First, we observe that while if-conditionals have both hypothetical and biscuit readings, in case-conditionals are obligatorily interpreted as biscuit conditionals. Second, we show that in case-conditionals are infelicitous when their antecedent is entailed by the common ground. If-conditionals, on the other hand, are compatible with these readings even under their biscuit interpretation. We then provide a formal account couched in inquisitive semantics. In a nutshell, we propose that in case-conditionals highlight the possibility that their antecedent is true, and assert their consequent.

Predicates of personal taste (PPTs) trigger an inference that the speaker is acquainted with the thing being evaluated. While the acquaintance inference (AI) is often analyzed as part of an utterance’s non-at-issue content, we argue it’s best explained as a semantic entailment. Building on Magri’s analysis of individual-level predicates as obligatory triggers of scalar exhaustification, we show that, if we treat the AI as arising from obligatory scalar exhaustification, we can explain much of the relevant projection data, provided we are willing to treating the AI as a semantic entailment of PPTs.

Cross-linguistically, the meaning of several attitude verbs depends on the kind of complement. This paper delineates a novel case of meaning alternation due to complementation: in Brazilian Portuguese, achar can be translated as think or find, depending on the syntax of its complement. We provide a formal analysis of these facts within Bondarenko’s (2023) framework, and discuss their implications for our understanding of Predicates of Personal Taste (PPTs) and Subjective Attitude Verbs (SAVs).