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I'm a Lecturer in Cognitive Science at Dartmouth College. I study meaning in natural language using tools from logic and computer science. Most of my current work focuses on modality, pronominal anaphora, scalar implicature, and subjective language. I received my PhD from the University of Maryland, College Park where I was advised by Fabrizio Cariani, Paolo Santorio, and Alexander Williams, and belonged to the interdisciplinary group Meaning at Maryland. My email is caleb.kendrick@dartmouth.edu.
While I publish under my full name, Jonathan Caleb Kendrick, I go by middle name "Caleb." In my free time, I sometimes play quizbowl.
Papers
Under Review and In Progress:
The Samaritan Paradox (Prior, 1958) is often taken to show that deontic ought is not upward monotonic. In particular, it’s often taken to show that ⌜ought (A ∧ B)⌝ does not entail ⌜ought A⌝. Parallel examples are often taken to show that desire ascriptions are not upward monotonic. We argue that this is mistaken. The Samaritan Paradox is really about presupposition; in particular, it shows that the domain of deontics can be restricted by their prejacent’s local context. We show that the resulting account yields natural solutions to Aqvist’s Paradox and the Paradox of Gentle Murder.
Ability modals exhibit a puzzling asymmetry in quantificational force: they’re strong in positive contexts, but weak in negative contexts. To solve this problem, I sketch an analogy with plural definites which exhibit a similar strength asymmetry known as homogeneity. I then show how we can solve the initial puzzle by combining an event-relative semantic for ability modals with the exhaustificationbased theory of homogeneity due to Bar-Lev (2018, 2021). In the resulting theory, ability ascriptions have variable force: in positive contexts, they have a meaning stronger than circumstantial possibility, while in negative contexts, they are as weak as circumstantial possibility modals. Finally, I argue that the exceptiontolerance of ability modals can be modeled analogously to non-maximality in plural definites.
Cross-linguistically, the meaning of several attitude verbs depends on the kind of complement. This paper delineates a novel case of meaning alternation due to complementation: in Brazilian Portuguese, achar can be translated as think or find, depending on the syntax of its complement. We provide a formal analysis of these facts within Bondarenko’s (2023) framework, and discuss their implications for our understanding of Predicates of Personal Taste (PPTs) and Subjective Attitude Verbs (SAVs).
Proceedings Papers (peer-reviewed by abstract):
According to the standard theory, a disjunction ⌜A or B⌝, the disjunct B is evaluated in a local context updated with the negation of the earlier conjunct ¬A. However, in (1a), the second disjunct is evaluated in a local context updated with a constituent of the first disjunct. (1) a. John must have failed his exam, or he would be happy. b. ⇒ If John passed his exam, he would be happy. To solve this problem, we propose a novel semantics for disjunction where the information state of the second disjunct is sensitive to the structurally-derived alternatives of the first disjunct. We then apply the resulting theory to solve a similar problem posed by anankastic conditionals.
We integrate Portner's theory of To-Do Lists with Schlenker's theory of local contexts. The resulting theory explains why imperatives often license restricted reading of modals in both disjunctions and conjunctions.
In this paper, we provide the first characterization of the semantics of conditionals headed by in case. We make two empirical contributions. First, we observe that while if-conditionals have both hypothetical and biscuit readings, in case-conditionals are obligatorily interpreted as biscuit conditionals. Second, we show that in case-conditionals are infelicitous when their antecedent is entailed by the common ground. If-conditionals, on the other hand, are compatible with these readings even under their biscuit interpretation. We then provide a formal account couched in inquisitive semantics. In a nutshell, we propose that in case-conditionals highlight the possibility that their antecedent is true, and assert their consequent.
Predicates of personal taste (PPTs) trigger an inference that the speaker is acquainted with the thing being evaluated. While the acquaintance inference (AI) is often analyzed as part of an utterance’s non-at-issue content, we argue it’s best explained as a semantic entailment. Building on Magri’s analysis of individual-level predicates as obligatory triggers of scalar exhaustification, we show that, if we treat the AI as arising from obligatory scalar exhaustification, we can explain much of the relevant projection data, provided we are willing to treating the AI as a semantic entailment of PPTs.